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Negotiations between President Violeta de Chamorro's administration and the leadership of the
National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) have entered their fourth week with no resolution of
the constitutional crisis that has gripped the country since February. Both sides are predicting
that an accord will be reached within days, but the negotiations appear to be snagged on various
amendments that encroach on presidential powers, and on an anti-nepotism amendment that could
affect presidential succession. The crisis began when Chamorro refused to accept several of the 65
amendments that the Assembly passed in December 1994 and promulgated in February particularly
those that restrict executive authority (see NotiSur, 09/09/94 and 12/09/94).
On March 8, the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia) ruled that the Assembly had exceeded
its authority by publishing the amendments, but also ruled that the president could not veto them.
Under pressure from the Court to accept the amendments, Chamorro offered instead to negotiate
with the Assembly for removal of the limitations on presidential authority contained in some of
the amendments (see NotiSur, 02/17/95 and 03/10/95). The most controversial amendment would
prohibit close relatives of a president from running for the presidency a prohibition that would keep
Chamorro's son-in-law and chief political lieutenant Antonio Lacayo from becoming a candidate in
the 1996 presidential election (see NotiSur, 04/28/95 and 05/26/96).
Other amendments that the president wants to change would reduce presidential authority in
the areas of court appointments and economic affairs. Another amendment spells out the duty of
the president to obey the Constitution and the laws but does not explicitly assign powers to the
president to execute the laws. Formal talks between the two branches began on May 24, after the
president proposed an agenda for a "governability and stability pact." The pact would go well
beyond reconciliation of differences with the Assembly over the amendments. The president's
declared position was that the amendments must be bundled together with a variety of other
outstanding issues in a general accord between the two branches. Chamorro wants to extract a
wide-ranging agreement from the Assembly on legislative priorities, present a united front to the
international lending agencies, and elevate the resulting pact to constitutional status thus assuring
a greater degree of political stability through the end of her presidential term in January 1997. In
effect, the Assembly would be obliged to use the pact as the basis for its future legislative agenda.
The Assembly's position, articulated by its president Luis Humberto Guzman during the first
round of talks, was that the amendments are not negotiable that Chamorro must accept them in
their present form before negotiations can proceed on such matters as the economic restructuring
program. Furthermore, under its newly amended powers of appointment, the Assembly named new
members of the Supreme Court over Chamorro's objections. Guzman wants Chamorro to accept
the new appointees and then allow the Court to rule on all issues related to the amendments. So
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far, the administration has refused to recognize the Assembly's claim to appointment power, and
Guzman has refused to back down on the appointments the Assembly made to the Court. With
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, archbishop of Managua, acting as mediator, a second round of
talks opened on May 31 with new proposals from an informal group made up of representatives of
the Catholic Church, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), and an alliance of liberal
and conservative political parties that includes members of the former Contra rebel forces.
One of the group's proposals would postpone implementation of the anti-nepotism amendment
until after the 1996 elections a solution also favored by Chamorro. Former vice president Sergio
Ramirez, who helped introduce the amendments in 1994, said an agreement was possible on
a formula that would allow Lacayo to run for president if it would help end the present crisis.
Chamorro also favors postponing the implementation of the amendment requiring administration
officials to make full financial statements before and after serving in the government. And, in an
effort to end the battle over how judges are appointed, Chamorro proposes that the executive
and legislative branches appoint members to both the Supreme Court and the Supreme Electoral
Council by mutual agreement.
Though the two sides have said at various intervals since the talks began on May 24 that a
breakthrough was imminent, outside pressures may soon force the two sides to find a resolution.
The most pressing issue is the disappearance of the Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo
Electoral, CSE). Because of the political deadlock, the Council's membership was not renewed
after the six-year term of its 10 members expired on June 7. Since the Council must prepare voter
lists, issue voter credentials, and supervise all other procedures for the 1996 elections, a prolonged
struggle over the amendments could throw the entire electoral process into turmoil. Also, any
makeshift method to renew the Council could raise post- election charges of improper procedures.
Chamorro proposed that the Assembly simply agree to extend the terms of the outgoing members
so as not to affect the Council's preparations for the 1996 election. But Guzman refused the
proposal, which he sees as an administration tactic to prepare for the elections without accepting the
amendments. He warned that if Chamorro still refuses to promulgate the amendments, there will be
no election. In addition, Obando y Bravo joined outgoing president of the Council Mariano Fiallos in
warning that a continued impasse could do irreparable damage to the elections and to Nicaraguan
democracy. Other pressures on the two sides to reach a settlement have come from Nicaragua's
international creditors.
Since the crisis began, Norway, Sweden, and the US have warned Nicaragua that failure to resolve
the crisis could jeopardize future financial assistance (see NotiSur, 06/15/95). By June 13, both sides
were making guarded predictions of an early settlement and saying that they were in agreement
on 58 of the original 65 amendments, though the substance of the agreements was not made
public. Among the amendments on which there is evidently now some agreement are agrarian
and tax reform, and Assembly powers to ratify international economic accords. Because Obando
y Bravo leaves for meetings in the Vatican on June 16, some observers said that June 15 would be
the deadline for completing negotiations. According to Miriam Arguello, Assembly member and
announced presidential candidate, the Assembly representatives will not negotiate beyond June
15. "We have a time limit," Arguello said. "If we do not finish, there will be nothing." [Sources:
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Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala City), 06/01/95; Reuter, 06/07/95; Agence France-Presse,
05/25/95, 05/31/95, 06/01/95, 06/07/95, 06/08/95]
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